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A rm's costs are typically tightly-guarded secrets. However, across six laboratory experiments and a eld
study we identify when and why rms benet from revealing cost information to consumers. Disclosing the
variable costs associated with a product's production heightens consumers' attraction to the rm, which
in turn increases purchase interest (Experiments 1-3). In fact, cost transparency has a stronger impact
on purchase interest than emphasizing the rm's personal relationship with the consumer - a much more
involved marketing tactic (Experiment 4). Further experiments explore boundary conditions and suggest
that the benet of cost transparency weakens as rms increase price relative to costs, and when markups
are made salient (Experiments 5-6). Consistent with our lab ndings, a natural experiment with an online
retailer demonstrates that cost transparency improves sales. In particular, cost transparency led to a 44.0%
increase in daily unit sales. This research implies that by revealing costs - typically tightly-guarded secrets
- managers can potentially improve both brand attraction and sales.
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1. Introduction
Research in operations and marketing has primarily dened cost transparency in the context of a
supplier-rm relationship - the two-way sharing of cost information between a rm and its suppliers,
with the goal of collaborating to reduce costs (Lamming et al. 2002, Zhu 2004). By contrast, we
examine cost transparency in the context of a customer-rm relationship - the one-way sharing of
cost information from a rm to its customers. As in supplier-rm relationships, we suggest that
disclosing costs in customer-rm relationships can be benecial to the rm.
In this paper, we explore what happens when rms voluntarily disclose their variable costs explic-
itly and directly to consumers. We suggest, and our results indicate, that this practice increases
consumers' attraction to the brand, in turn increasing their willingness to buy (Experiments 1-3).
In fact, cost transparency is more eective at increasing purchase interest than the (typically more
involved) marketing tactic of emphasizing a rm's personal relationship with its customer (Exper-
iment 4). Further experiments explore boundary conditions and suggest that the benet of cost
transparency weakens as prot margins increase (Experiment 5) and reverses when markups are so
high that they violate market norms (Experiment 6). Consistent with these six lab experiments, a
12
natural experiment conducted in the eld with an online retailer conrmed that cost transparency
boosts purchases. Specically, the introduction of cost transparency led to a 44.0% increase in
daily unit sales for the target products. We argue, and our results suggest, that by revealing costs
- typically tightly-guarded secrets - managers can improve brand attraction, and in turn, sales.
2. Operational, Price, and Cost Transparency
Cost transparency refers to the disclosure of the variable costs associated with a product's produc-
tion process. It is therefore related to, but distinct from, the constructs of operational transparency
and price transparency.
Operational transparency refers to how a rm reveals its operating processes to its customer
(Buell et al. 2014). Research suggests that consumers prefer service web sites that are operationally
transparent relative to those that are not (Buell and Norton 2011). For example, the travel site
Kayak.com is beloved in part because of its operational transparency - it discloses which airline is
being searched and updates the results throughout the search process. Such transparency increases
consumers' perception of the eort required to create the product, in turn heightening their sense
of gratitude and willingness to pay (Gersho et al. 2012, Morales 2005, Buell and Norton 2011).
Voluntary disclosure of social and environmental impacts - such as greenhouse gas emissions - can
boost a rm's market share (Kalkanci et al. 2013). And information on production processes can
aect product customer satisfaction; for example, fudge tastes better when consumers are told
that it was produced using an expensive (as opposed to inexpensive) machine (Chinander and
Schweitzer 2003).
Relative to operational transparency, cost transparency is a more intimate form of disclosure: it
entails disclosing the variable costs to produce a good. There are multiple ways of operationalizing
cost transparency (which we test in this paper). In its strong form, cost transparency entails
divulging the variable costs associated with each component of producing a good; a weaker form
entails simply divulging the total variable costs to produce the good.
Price transparency refers to the practice of revealing the beneciaries of a product's revenues
- for example, by dividing a price into gross retail proceeds, royalties, and taxes (Carter and
Curry, 2010). While they are related constructs, in cost transparency, a highly sensitive piece of
information is explicitly revealed: the costs to produce the good.
Similarly, price partitioning refers to the practice of revealing the price of the component parts of
a product - for example, dividing a product's price into base price and shipping and handling fees
(Bertini and Wathieu 2008, Morwitz et al. 1998). Price partitioning increases consumer purchase
intentions via a cognitive process - consumers recall smaller numbers when prices are partitioned,
creating the illusion of a low price (Morwitz et al. 1998). On the other hand, as we will show, the
eect of cost transparency on purchase intent is driven by an aective process.3
3. Cost Transparency as Intimate Firm Disclosure
We suggest that cost transparency is a form of intimate disclosure by a rm to the consumer, since
cost breakdowns are usually condential, proprietary knowledge. A substantial body of work on
the social psychology of disclosure suggests that intimate disclosure heightens relationship quality
(Laurenceau et al. 1998). Those who disclose intimate information are generally seen as likable
(Collins and Porras 1994, Wortman et al. 1976) and attractive (Collins and Porras 1994, Laurenceau
et al. 1998).
Self-disclosure has been studied not only in the context of interpersonal relationships, but also
in the context of relationships between humans and computers. For one, the mere look and feel of
a website has been found to aect consumers' willingness to disclose (John et al. 2011). Moreover,
people are more \attracted" to computers that disclose intimate information relative to those
that do not. For example, Moon (2000) demonstrated that people were more interested in using a
computer that had \divulged" something sensitive - that it \rarely gets to use its full potential"
- relative to a computer that had merely \divulged" that when it \doesn't have any work to do,
it usually just runs a screensaver program" (Moon, 2000). We posit that if an inanimate object
can engender attraction through intimate disclosure, a rm is likely to also benet from the same
strategy.
Of course, not all disclosure leads to attraction. Intimate disclosure that is too personal does
not elicit attraction. Rather, disclosure and liking appear to have a curvilinear relationship - those
who disclose at medium intimacy levels are liked more than those who disclose at very high or low
levels (Cozby 1972). The intimacy of disclosure is negatively correlated with valence - generally
speaking, the more unsavory the information, the more intimate the disclosure is perceived to be
(Sedikides et al. 1999). Thus, we predict that the eectiveness of cost transparency in bolstering
purchase intentions will be dampened when the rm discloses unsavory, and hence, highly intimate
information - that prices are high relative to costs (Experiment 5).
When might cost transparency backre? Although consumers understand and accept that rms
must make prots (Bolton et al. 2003, Kahneman et al. 1986), they punish rms that violate estab-
lished norms of price fairness (Campbell 1999, Xia et al. 2004). For example, most consumers react
extremely negatively to a rm that dramatically increases the price, and hence, prot margins of
snow shovels during a winter storm (Kahneman et al. 1986). Therefore, we predict that consumers'
purchase interest will decrease when a rm explicitly discloses that its prot margins are very high
relative to market norms - i.e., relative to those of its competitors (Experiment 6).
4. Overview of Experiments
Across six laboratory experiments and a eld study with an online retailer, we examine the eect of
cost transparency - revealing a rm's variable costs of production - on consumer purchase behavior.4
We begin by presenting the results of six laboratory experiments in which participants interacted
with the simulated website of a fashion retailer selling t-shirts. We nd that cost transparency
is more eective at boosting purchase interest than operational transparency (Experiments 1-2).
This eect persists even when variable costs that are strongly disliked by consumers - such as
transportation costs - are high relative to those that consumers nd more palatable - such as
those associated with raw materials (Experiment 3). We also nd that cost transparency is more
eective than emphasizing existing consumer-rm relationships in promoting purchase intentions
(Experiment 4).
Further experiments explore boundary conditions and suggest that the benets of cost trans-
parency weaken, but do not reverse, as rms increase prices relative to costs (Experiment 5). Only
when a rm's prot margins violate market norms does cost transparency backre (Experiment
6).
Finally, in a natural experiment conducted in the eld with an online retailer, cost transparency
improves sales. Cost transparency led to an 44.0% increase in unit sales for the target products. We
conclude with a discussion of the implications of these ndings for managers, as well as limitations
and opportunities for future research.
4.1. Experiment 1: Cost Transparency and Willingness to Buy
Experiment 1 tests the eect of cost transparency on customers' willingness to buy in a simulated
online retail environment. Several burgeoning fashion retailers have some level of cost transparency
embedded in their retail websites, revealing not only their steps of production, but also the costs
associated with each of these steps (Everlane 2012, Neilson and Mistry 2013). We modeled our
stimuli after such retailers.
4.1.1. Method
Design and Procedure Participants (N = 272, Mage = 31:5, 62% male) completed this online
experiment in exchange for $0.25. Participants rst indicated their gender. Then, they were told
that they would see a simulated retail website page for a product and would be asked to indicate
their interest in purchasing the product.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of nine experimental conditions, of a 3 (Price: $10,
$15, $20) x 3 (Transparency: Control, Operational, Cost) between-subjects design. The prices were
comparable to other designer t-shirts found online at the time of the experiment (Everlane 2012).
In the no transparency (control) condition, participants saw a baseline interface which featured
an image of a model (same gender as participant) wearing the t-shirt, and included the name of the
product, its price, alternate colors and sizes, and a mechanism for selecting the desired quantity5
Control Condition Screen (Male) Control Condition Screen (Female)
Figure 1 Control Condition Screens
Note: Screens were matched to the gender of the participant.
Operational Transparency (Experiments 1, 2) Cost Transparency (Experiments 1, 3, 4, 5, 6)
Cost Transparency with Unfavorable Allocation (Experiment 3) Summed Cost Transparency (Experiment 2)
Cost Transparency + Sum (Experiment 2)
Cost Transparency + Sum  (Experiment 6)
Cost Transparency + Sum + Markup + Benchmark (Experiment 6) Cost Transparency + Sum + Markup (Experiment 6)
Figure 2 Experimental Manipulations
The experimental conditions included the control information, plus the infographic depicted above.6
for purchase (Figure 1). Unless indicated otherwise, this basic interface served as the baseline in
all experiments.
In the operational transparency condition, an infographic was added to the bottom of the baseline
interface. The graphic was entitled `What goes into the production of our Women's[Men's] V?' and
depicted six operational steps - cotton, cutting, sewing, dyeing, nishing, and transport. In the
cost transparency condition, the (true) cost of each of the six operational steps was also provided,
i.e., $2.75, $0.35, $1.35, $0.50, $1.25, and $0.50 respectively (Figure 2).
1. How likely would you be to purchase from this website in general, either this item or another?
2. What was the price of the product you saw?
3. How much do you think it cost to make this shirt?
4. How attractive do you nd this product?
5. How reasonable is the price of this product?
6. My feelings toward this retailer can best be described as: (very unsatised - unsatised).
7. If it were made available to me, over the next year, my use of this retailer would be: (very
infrequent - very frequent).
8. This item is well made.
9. This item is one that would make me feel good.
10. This item is a good product for the price.
11. This item would make a good impression on other people.
12. This item is too expensive.
13. This item has consistent quality.
14. This item would not last a long time.
15. This site appears more trustworthy than other sites I've visited.
16. The site represents a company or organization that will deliver on promises made.
17. My overall trust in this product website is: (very low - very high).
18. My overall believability of the information on this site is: (very low - very high).
19. This site represents a company that engages in ethical business practices.
20. This site represents a company that pays its workers a fair wage.
Table 1 Additional Measures (Experiments 1, 4, 5, and 6)
Dependent Measures Participants indicated their willingness to buy the t-shirt by responding to
the item: \Given the opportunity, how likely would you be to purchase this product?" (7-point
response scale; 1 = Not at all likely - 7 = Very likely). Participants then provided their age,7
highest level of education, and monthly household income. Finally, in this, and Experiments 4-
6, participants also answered a series of secondary questions assessing their purchase experience
(Table 1).1 All experiments concluded with demographic questions, unless otherwise noted. We
set the desired number of participants at the outset of each experiment and did not analyze the
data until that number was reached. No data were excluded and we report all manipulations and
measures.
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Figure 3 Experiment 1. Cost transparency increases willingness to buy versus control more than operational
transparency alone.
4.1.2. Results We conducted a 3 (Price: $10, $15, $20) x 3 (Transparency: Control, Opera-
tional, Cost) analysis of variance (ANOVA) on willingness to buy (Figure 3). Not surprisingly, there
was a main eect of price: willingness to buy decreased as price increased (F(2;263) = 12:29;p <
1 We note that reported results in this paper are substantively similar after controlling for individual items listed in
Table 1. As such, while individual covariates listed in Table 1 surfaced as signicant in some models, for parsimony,
we do not describe them further in subsequent sections. Covariates seldom reduced the signicance of the focal
independent variables, no more than would be expected by chance due to multiple comparisons.8
0:01). More importantly, there was a main eect of transparency (F(2;263) = 4:69;p = 0:01).
Specically, willingness to buy was greater in the cost transparency condition relative to both the
control condition (Mcost =4:16;SD =1:98;Mnone =3:31;SD =1:87;t(177)=2:95;p<0:01) and the
operational transparency condition (Mops = 3:57;SD = 1:80;t(180) = 2:10;p = 0:04). Willingness
to buy was not signicantly dierent between the operational transparency and control conditions
(t(181) = 0:96;p = 0:34). The interaction between the transparency condition and price was not
signicant, F(4;263) = 0:64;p = 0:64. Gender, education, age, and income were all non-signicant
when added to the model as covariates (p > 0:26). Throughout the rest of our experiments all
reported results remain substantively the same when controlling for demographic variables (gender,
education, age, and income).
4.2. Experiment 2: Cost Component Transparency versus Aggregated Cost
Transparency
In Experiment 1, we explored how the depth of disclosure aorded by cost transparency inu-
ences consumers' willingness to buy. Cost transparency was more eective at boosting purchase
interest than both the control and operational transparency conditions. Experiment 2 replicates
this basic benecial eect of cost transparency and provides evidence of the process underlying it.
Specically, we test whether the eect of cost transparency on willingness to buy is mediated by
consumers' attraction to the rm (Moon 2000). Experiment 2 also tests whether a weak form of
cost transparency - simply divulging the total summed cost to produce the product - is sucient
to be benecial.
4.2.1. Method
Design and Procedure Participants (N = 402, Mage = 31:3, 68% male) completed this online
experiment in exchange for $0.40 and were randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions
varying in transparency: no transparency, operational transparency, cost transparency with sum,
(i.e., divulging the cost of each component and the sum total of all components), and summed cost
transparency (i.e., only revealing the total sum of all components) (Figure 2). To maximize the
salience of our manipulations, we used a streamlined version of our shopping interface, excluding
alternate colors and sizes, and setting the t-shirt price at $10. For both cost transparency conditions,
we noted that the aggregate cost of producing the t-shirt was $6.70.
Dependent Measures We measured willingness to buy using the same scale as Experiment 1. We
also measured a potential mediator: attraction to the rm, using a modied version of Moon's
(2000) scale. Specically, participants indicated the extent to which they agreed with each of the
following four statements on a 7 point scale (1 = strongly disagree - 7 = strongly agree): this website
represents a brand that is likable; this website represents a kind brand; this website represents
a helpful brand; this website represents a friendly brand. We summed participants' responses to
these items to create a composite measure of brand attraction (Cronbach's =:93).9
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Figure 4 Experiment 2. Cost transparency with the sum of all costs increases willingness to buy more than
alternative treatments.
4.2.2. Results
Willingness to buy A one way ANOVA revealed signicant dierences in willingness to buy as
a function of the transparency manipulation (F(3;398) = 5:02;p < 0:01; Figure 4. Willingness to
buy was greater in the cost transparency with sum condition, relative to the control (Mc+s =
4:91;SD = 1:54;Mnone = 4:15;SD = 1:88;t(201) = 3:14;p < 0:01). However, relative to the control
condition, willingness to buy was not signicantly higher in either the operational transparency
(Mops = 4:55;SD = 1:54;t(199) = 1:61;p = 0:11) or summed cost transparency condition (Msum =
4:07;SD =1:87;t(197)=0:77;p=0:90).
Attraction to brand A one way ANOVA revealed signicant dierences in attraction to brand as a
function of the transparency manipulation (F(3;398)=13:34;p<0:01). Relative to control, brand
attraction was signicantly higher in the cost transparency with sum condition (Mc+s =5:40;SD =
1:05;Mnone =4:86;SD =1:34;t(200)= 5:33;p<0:01) and the operational transparency condition
(Mops = 4:96;SD = 1:09;t(199) = 2:63;p < 0:01), but not in the summed transparency condition10
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Figure 5 Experiments 2, 3, 4, and 5. Brand attraction mediates the relationship between cost transparency and
willingness to buy across multiple experiments. `CI' indicates the bias-corrected condence intervals of the size of
the indirect eect (a x b) based on 5000 resamples.
Note: In Experiment 2, the cost transparency condition also included the total cost.
p< 0:10
p< 0:05
p< 0:01
(Msum = 4:67;SD = 1:46;t(197) = 0:74;p = 0:46). Moreover, brand attraction was signicantly
higher in the cost transparency with total condition than in the operational transparency condition
(t(201)=2:89;p<0:01).
Mediation Analysis We tested whether attraction mediates willingness to buy. First, as reported
above, participants in the cost transparency with total condition reported higher willingness to buy
( =0:65, p<0:01), as well as higher brand attraction ( =0:69;p<0:01). When brand attraction
and the cost transparency with total condition were included in the regression model predicting
willingness to buy, the eect of attraction remained signicant ( = 0:76;p < 0:01), but the eect
of the cost transparency with total condition was reduced to insignicance ( = 0:13;p = 0:45).
Following the procedures outlined by Zhao et al. (2010), we used a bootstrap procedure to construct
bias-corrected condence intervals for the indirect eect based on 5000 resamples. The 95% bias-
corrected condence interval excluded zero (0:32;0:81), providing support for full mediation (Figure
5).
4.3. Experiment 3: Varying Cost Allocation
Revealing the rm's variable costs of production in addition to total cost was more eective at
boosting purchase interest than aggregate cost transparency or operational transparency alone.11
Experiment 2 also explored the process underlying the benecial eect of cost transparency. Con-
sistent with previous research on disclosure and attraction, the eectiveness of cost transparency
on willingness to buy was mediated by consumers' attraction to the disclosing rm (Moon 2000).
It is possible that the benecial eect of cost transparency was driven by the specic allocation of
costs among the dierent cost components. Costs for intangible components such as transportation
($0.50) and labor ($1.35) were low relative to those for raw materials ($2.75). It is plausible that
consumers more strongly dislike costs of intangible components - perhaps judging them to be
wasteful or superuous - relative to those of tangible components (i.e., raw materials) (Gneezy
et al. 2014). In Experiment 3, we test whether the results of Experiments 1 and 2 generalize to
cost allocations that consumers nd undesirable. Experiment 3 also further explores the process
underlying the benecial eect of cost transparency.
4.3.1. Method
Pretest We conducted a pretest (N = 100, Mage =30:4, 60% male) to understand how consumers
assess the allocation of costs. Participants were presented with the control stimuli from Experiment
1 - a t-shirt priced at $10. They were told that the shirt cost $6.70 to make, and asked \What do
you estimate each of the following steps cost?" for each of the six steps - cotton, cutting, sewing,
dyeing, nishing, and transport. The estimates for cotton spending (M = $1:68;SD = 0:98) and
transport spending (M = $1:35;SD = 0:73) were signicantly dierent from the cost allocations
from Experiment 1 (cotton vs. $2.75: t(99)=10:91;p< 0:01; transport vs. $0.50:t(99)=11:64;p<
0:01).
Next, participants indicated which step the company should spend more and less money on.
Participants were most likely to choose `cotton' as the step to spend more on (42%), and `transport'
as the step to spend less on (52%).
Therefore, this pre-test suggests that indeed, the cost allocation used in Experiments 1 and 2 was
relatively favorable in consumers' eyes. In Experiment 3, we therefore manipulated the favorability
of the cost allocation to test whether the rst two experiments' ndings generalize to situations in
which the costs of intangible components - such as transportation - are relatively high and hence,
undesirable.
Design and Procedure Participants (N = 456, 57% male2) completed this online experiment in
exchange for $0.25. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions
varying in cost transparency: no transparency, cost transparency with a favorable cost allocation,
and cost transparency with an unfavorable cost allocation (Figure 2). The no transparency (control)
2 Due to an error, age data were not collected for this experiment, though subjects were recruited through the same
platform and using the same methodology as the other experiments, so average age is likely similar.12
and favorable allocation conditions were the same as the control and cost transparency conditions
from Experiment 1, respectively. In the unfavorable allocation condition, the cost associated with
cotton was reduced from $2.75 to $0.50, while the cost associated with transport was increased
from $0.50 to $2.75. The other costs were the same as those in the favorable allocation condition.
Therefore, we shifted costs from the favored production step (procuring raw materials) to the step
on which pretest participants wanted the company to spend less (transportation).
Dependent Measures The willingness to buy and composite brand attraction (Cronbach's  =
:90) measures were administered as in Experiment 2.
4.3.2. Results
Willingness to buy A one way ANOVA revealed signicant dierences in willingness to buy as
a function of the transparency manipulation (F(2;453) = 3:58;p = 0:03; Figure 4). Relative to
control, willingness to buy was signicantly higher in both the favorable cost transparency condition
(Mfav =4:90;SD =1:59;Mnone =4:41;SD =1:99;t(299)=2:35;p=0:02) and the unfavorable cost
transparency condition (Munf = 4:86;SD = 1:69;t(303) = 2:14;p = 0:03). The dierence between
favorable and unfavorable cost transparency was not signicant (t(304)=0:19;p=0:60).
Attraction to brand A one way ANOVA revealed signicant dierences in brand attraction as a
function of the transparency manipulation (F(2;453)=13:34;p<0:01). Relative to control, brand
attraction was signicantly higher in both the favorable cost transparency condition (Mfav =
5:49;SD = 0:89;Mcontrol = 4:86;SD = 1:15;t(299) = 3:77;p < 0:01) and the unfavorable cost trans-
parency condition (Munf = 5:34;SD = 1:24;t(303) = 3:48;p < 0:01). The dierence between favor-
able and unfavorable cost transparency was not signicant (t(304)=1:24;p=0:90).
Mediation Analysis We again tested whether attraction mediates willingness to buy. We indexed
each of the conditions to create a continuous measure of cost transparency, coded as follows: 0
(control), 1(unfavorable allocation), and 2(favorable allocation). The continuous cost transparency
measure predicted both brand attraction ( =0:32;p<0:01) and willingness to buy ( =0:24;p=
0:02). When brand attraction and both cost transparency conditions were included in the regres-
sion model predicting willingness to buy, the eect of attraction remained signicant ( =0:81;p<
0:01), but the eect of cost transparency was reduced to insignicance ( =  0:01;p = 0:89) pro-
viding support for full mediation. We again used a bootstrap procedure to construct bias-corrected
condence intervals for the indirect eect based on 5000 resamples (Zhao et al. 2010). The 95% bias-
corrected condence interval excluded zero (0:16;0:36), suggesting a signicant mediation eect
(Figure 5).13
4.4. Experiment 4: Cost Transparency versus Personalized Brand Relationships
Experiment 3 suggests that the capacity for cost transparency to boost willingness to buy persists
even when costs are allocated in an undesirable way. To the extent that brand attraction accounts
for the benet of cost transparency, it is interesting to measure the eects of cost transparency
after priming a prior personal relationship with a brand. Thus, Experiment 4 tests whether the
eect of cost transparency is aected by priming prior consumer-brand relationships.
4.4.1. Method
Design and Procedure Participants (N = 329, Mage = 30:7, 59% Male) completed this online
experiment in exchange for $0.25. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions,
of a 2 (Transparency: Control, Cost) x 2 (Brand Relationship: Absent, Present) between-subjects
design. The control and cost transparency conditions were the same as Experiment 1. Brand
relationship was manipulated in the introduction of the experiment. In the relationship absent
condition, participants were told to \Imagine that this is a brand that you are encountering for
the very rst time. You encounter this product page on the company's public website." In the
relationship present condition, participants were told to \Imagine that this is a brand that you
are familiar with. You encounter this product page in a private section of the company's public
website, to which you have been given a personalized login."
Dependent Measures The willingness to buy and composite brand attraction (Cronbach's  =
:93) measures were administered as in Experiments 1-3.
4.4.2. Results
Willingness to buy We conducted a 2 (Transparency: None, Cost) x 2 (Brand Relationship:
Absent, Present) ANOVA on willingness to buy (Figure 6). Consistent with the previous exper-
iments, there was a main eect of cost transparency (F(1;325) = 7:79;p < 0:01). Relative to the
control, willingness to buy was signicantly higher in the cost transparency condition (Mcost =
4:52;SD = 1:87;Mcontrol = 3:96;SD = 1:96;t(327) = 2:65;p < 0:01). In addition, willingness to buy
was marginally greater when a relationship was present versus absent (Mpresent = 4:42;SD =
1:98;Mabsent = 4:10;SD = 1:88;(F(1;325) = 3:07;p = 0:08). There was no interaction between per-
sonalization and transparency (F(1;325)=0:32;p=0:57). Thus, the positive eect of transparency
on willingness to buy held regardless of the relationship between the rm and the brand, suggesting
the eects are complementary.
Attraction to brand Replicating the ndings of Experiments 2 and 3, brand attraction mediated
the eect of cost transparency on willingness to buy. First, cost transparency predicted willingness
to buy ( =0:55;p=0:01), as well as brand attraction ( =0:51;p<0:01). When brand attraction
and cost transparency were included in the regression model predicting willingness to buy, the14
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Figure 6 Experiment 4. Cost transparency increases propensity to purchase more versus the control than brand
relationship.
eect of attraction remained signicant ( =0:92;p<0:01), but the eect of cost transparency was
reduced to insignicance ( = 0:08;p = 0:65). We again used a bootstrap procedure to construct
bias-corrected condence intervals of the size of the indirect eect based on 5000 resamples (Zhao
et al. 2010). The 95% bias-corrected condence interval excluded zero (0.23, 0.82), suggesting a
signicant mediation eect (Figure 5).
4.5. Experiment 5: Cost Transparency and Prot Margins
Experiment 4 suggests that priming a brand relationship does not moderate the eect of cost trans-
parency on willingness to buy. In Experiment 5, we explore how prot margins (i.e., price relative
to cost) moderate the eects of cost transparency on willingness to buy. Given the curvilinear
relationship between disclosure intimacy and liking (Cozby 1972), we predicted that the eect of
cost transparency on willingness to buy would weaken, but not reverse, when the rm discloses
high prot margins - i.e., a particularly unsavory, and hence also intimate, piece of information.
4.5.1. Method15
Design and Procedure Participants (N = 958, Mage = 31:4, 61% Male) completed this online
experiment in exchange for $0.25. They were randomly assigned to one of 28 experimental condi-
tions of a 14 (Price level: $10, $15, $20, $25, $30, $35, $40, $45, $50, $60, $70, $80, $90, $100) x 2
(Transparency: Control, Cost) between-subjects design. With the exception of the price manipula-
tion, the control and cost transparency conditions were the same as in Experiment 1. We used the
online website of a popular department store to determine a relevant range of product prices ($8-
$78). Thus, the price manipulation reected the varying price points a consumer might encounter
in the marketplace.
Dependent Measures The willingness to buy and composite brand attraction (Cronbach's  =
:93) measures were administered as in Experiments 1-4.
4.5.2. Results
Willingness to buy We conducted a 14 (Price level: $10, $15, $20, $25, $30, $35, $40, $45, $50,
$60, $70, $80, $90, $100) x 2 (Transparency: Control, Cost) ANOVA on willingness to buy, with
price as a continuous variable (Figure 7). Not surprisingly, willingness to buy decreased as price
increased (F(1;954) = 121:2;p < 0:01). More interestingly, cost transparency increased willingness
to buy, regardless of price (Mnone =2:26;SD =1:65;Mcost =2:48;SD =1:79;F(1;954)=10:80;p<
0:01). There was also a signicant interaction between price and transparency on willingness to
buy (F(1;954) = 6:05;p = 0:01); the benet of cost transparency decreased - but did not reverse -
as price increased.
We conducted a follow-up analysis in which we split the sample at the median price. For the
479 participants in the below median price conditions (<$45.00), there was a signicant main
eect of cost transparency on willingness to buy (F(1;477)=10:73;p<0:01). However, for the 479
participants in the above median price conditions above ($45.00 and above), there was no signicant
main eect of cost transparency (F(1;477) = 0:91;p = 0:34). This analysis provides additional
support for the notion that the benet of cost transparency is greater when prot margins are
relatively small.
Brand attraction This measure produced a similar pattern of results. A 14 (Price level: $10,
$15, $20, $25, $30, $35, $40, $45, $50, $60, $70, $80, $90, $100) x 2 (Transparency: Control,
Cost) ANOVA revealed both a signicant main eect of price (F(1;941) = 74:34;p < 0:01) and
cost transparency (F(1;941)=9:61;p<0:01). There was also a signicant interaction (F(1;941)=
5:12;p=0:02) such that cost transparency increased brand attraction most at low prices.
Mediation Replicating the ndings of Experiments 2-4, brand attraction again mediated the
eect of cost transparency on willingness to buy. Controlling for price, cost transparency predicted
both willingness to buy ( =0:24;p=0:02) and brand attraction ( =0:20;p=0:02). When brand16
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Figure 7 Experiment 5. The eectiveness of cost transparency decreases - but does not reverse - as price
increases relative to cost.
attraction and cost transparency were included in the regression model predicting willingness to
buy, the eect of attraction remained signicant ( = 0:61;p < 0:01), but the eect of cost trans-
parency was reduced to insignicance ( = 0:11;p = 0:21). We again used a bootstrap procedure
to construct bias-corrected condence intervals of the size of the indirect eect based on 5000
resamples (Zhao et al. 2010). The 95% bias-corrected condence interval excluded zero, (0:02;0:23),
suggesting a signicant mediation eect (Figure 5).
4.6. Experiment 6: Cost Transparency and Markup Salience
The previous experiment suggests that, holding cost constant, price is a boundary condition for
the eectiveness of cost transparency in boosting purchase intent. However, our results suggest
that even with an extremely high markup, cost transparency does not reduce purchase intent. One
possible explanation for this pattern is that when a rm exposes its costs, its markup may not be
especially salient. In Experiment 6, we test whether making markups more salient will reverse the
eectiveness of cost transparency.
There are several ways a retailer can make its markup salient. For one, a retailer can calculate and
publish its markup. A retailer can also estimate and publish its competitor's markups - comparing17
one's prices to those of a competitor is a common marketing practice (Grewal et al. 1998, Kahneman
et al. 1986, Li Miao and Mattila 2007). We anticipate that if a rm reveals that its own markup
is higher than that of its competitors, this will decrease purchase propensity, since this action is a
direct violation of social norms. Violating social norms breaks down the positive eects of disclosure
on liking (Collins and Porras 1994).
4.6.1. Method
Design and Procedures Participants (N = 453, Mage = 31:3, 59% Male) completed this online
experiment in exchange for $0.25. Participants were randomly assigned to 1 of 15 experimental
conditions, of a 3 (Price: $10, $20, $30) x 5 (Transparency: Control, Cost, Cost + Sum, Cost + Sum
+ Markup, Cost + Sum + Markup + Benchmark). The former two conditions were identical to the
conditions used in Experiments 1 - 5. The latter three conditions progressively increased markup
salience. The \Cost + Sum" graphic connoted the same information as in Experiment 2, with a
dierent graphic design denoting total cost (Figure 2). In the \Cost + Sum + Markup" condition,
we added the rm's markup relative to cost - noting for instance, that $30 corresponded with a
4.5X price markup (relative to the total cost of $6.70). Note that the markup conditions further
emphasize the rm's prot margin - a conservative design choice (i.e., is likely to bias against
nding a benet of cost transparency). Finally, in the \Cost + Total + Markup + Benchmark"
condition, we further noted that a similar shirt at a `traditional retailer' is priced at $25, a 3.7X
markup over the estimated cost of production. Thus, at the $10 and $20 price points, the rm's
markup was lower, and therefore, more desirable than that of its' competitor, and vice versa for
the $30 price point.
Dependent Measure The willingness to buy measure was administered as in Experiments 1-5.
4.6.2. Results
Willingness to Buy We conducted a 3 (Price: $10, $20, $30) x 5 (Transparency: Control, Cost,
Cost + Sum, Cost + Sum + Markup, Cost + Sum + Markup + Benchmark) ANOVA on willingness
to buy (Figure 7). As expected, we observed a signicant main eect of price, F(1;443)=61:6;p<
0:01 : as price increased, willingness to buy decreased. Overall, we found a marginally signicant
main eect of transparency, F(4;443)=1:98;p=0:10, as well as a marginally signicant interaction
between price and transparency condition, F(4;443)=8:37;p=0:06.
To better understand the relationship between price and markup salience, we indexed each of the
ve transparency conditions to create a continuous measure of markup salience, coded as follows:
0 (control), 1 (cost), 2 (cost + sum), 3 (cost + sum + markup), and 4 (cost + sum + markup
+ benchmark). As price increased, so did the negative implications of greater markup salience.
We then regressed the continuous measure of markup salience, price, and the 2-way interaction of18
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Figure 8 Experiment 6. Making the markup more salient diminishes the eectiveness of higher cost
transparency, particularly at higher price points.
markup salience and price on willingness to buy. As expected, the main eect of price is signicant
( =  0:05;p = 0:01). The main eect of the markup salience variable is marginally signicant
( =0:30;p=0:08), and most importantly, the interaction between markup salience and price has a
signicant negative coecient ( = 0:02;p=0:02). This suggests that the level of markup salience
negatively moderates the relationship between price and transparency (Figure 8).
Furthermore, willingness to buy was marginally higher in the $10 condition when competitor
markups were revealed relative to the control (Mc+s+m+b = 4:86;SD = 1:69;Mcontrol = 3:92;SD =
1:78;t(51) = 1:97;p = 0:05). However, relative to the control, willingness to buy was signicantly
lower in the $30 condition when competitor markups were revealed (Mc+s+m+b = 2:17;SD =
1:72;Mcontrol =3:34;SD =2:13;t(60)=2:37;p=0:02). This suggests that by making it salient that
markups are counter-normatively high, cost transparency can decrease customer purchase inten-
tions.
4.7. Field Evidence
On December 2, 2013, a privately-held online retailer launched a holiday gift shop with a single
email to its mailing list, promoting a leather wallet, oered in 5 colors (burgundy, black, grey, bone,19
and tan), and priced at $115.00. At the end of January, in an eort to boost post-holiday sales, the
retailer prepared to add a cost transparency infographic to its retail website on the product detail
pages that corresponded with each of the wallet's ve color combinations. While the company had
published similar infographics for other products on its site in the past (for example, on its blog),
this was the rst time it had used such a graphic on a product detail page (the page from which a
customer adds a product to her shopping cart). As the wallets diered only in color, the company
intended to use the same infographic for every wallet in the line.
The infographic detailed the materials and processes involved in the production of the wallet, as
well as the costs associated with each component - leather ($14.68), construction ($38.56), duties
($4.26) and transportation ($1.00). It also denoted the total cost ($58.50), the fact the wallet was
priced with a 1.9x markup, and the statement that a comparable wallet would be sold with a 6
markup by a competitor. Notably, this manipulation is identical in features to the \cost + sum +
markup + benchmark" treatment in Experiment 6 (in which the price is relatively low and hence,
the markup is not counter-normatively high) (Figure 2).
4.7.1. Data and Empirical Approach Our eld evidence takes advantage of an error in
the implementation of this infographic. While managers had intended for the infographic to be
introduced for all ve wallet color combinations, it was accidentally only implemented for three of
them (burgundy, black, and grey) and omitted for the other two (bone and tan). This mistake was
overlooked for a ve-week period, creating a natural experiment.
Our empirical strategy leverages the partial introduction of the cost transparency infographic
as an exogenous shock that creates sets of comparable treatment (cost transparency) and control
(blind) products. This treatment provides a conservative test of the eects of cost transparency,
since customers browsing multiple wallet colors may have been exposed to the infographic and
(correctly) inferred that the process and costs it depicted applied across color combinations. While
the benets of the infographic likely accrued to both groups, our identication comes from the fact
that every customer who browsed wallets in the treatment group was exposed to the infographic,
while customers who browsed wallets in the control group may not have been.
We use a dierence-in-dierences approach to compare how the dierence in daily sales between
the treatment and control groups changed before and after the introduction of the infographic.
By doing so, we isolate the eect of cost transparency on the daily count of wallets sold in each
category. We analyze the sales performance of ve color combinations over a 92-day period (n
= 460), starting with the launch of the holiday gift shop on December 2, 2013 and ending on
March 6, 2014. The infographic was introduced on January 28, 2014. We estimate the following
linear xed eect specication, using a Newey West estimator for standard errors that accounts20
for autocorrelation within colors and heteroskedasticity with a small number of products (Newey
et al. 1987, Schaer 2010).
COUNTc;t =f(0 +1POSTt +2POST TREATMENTc +3V ISITSc;t+
4V ISITS
2
c;t +5NOV ISITSc;t +6NOV ISITSc;t 1+
7NOSALEc;t 1 +c +c;t)
(1)
In the specication above, COUNTc;t represents the count of items sold for color c on day
t. POSTt is a dummy variable denoting observations after the introduction of the infographic.
While the cost transparency treatment is subsumed by the color xed eect, c, POSTt 
TREATMENTc is a dummy variable that specically highlights observations in the cost trans-
parency treatment conditions after the introduction of the infographic and is the focal independent
variable of our analysis. V ISITSc;t and V ISITS2
c;t control for daily dierences in visits to the
product detail pages for each wallet.
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Figure 9 Field Evidence. Average Daily Unit Sales per Treatment and Control Color.
Note: Dashed vertical line indicates the date the infographic was added. Values withheld to protect condential
company information.
A limitation of our analysis is that we were not given data on inventory levels. While the assign-
ment of the treatment was quasi-random as described above, given the low number of products
in the treatment and control groups, a stockout could materially inuence sales. To address this
concern, we introduce several additional control variables. When the product is out of stock on the21
company's website, a \SOLD OUT" message blacks out the product on search results pages, though
the product page remains accessible. NOV ISITSc;t is a dummy variable indicating whether no
visits to the product page occurred for a specic color on a given day. NOV ISITSc;t 1 represents
whether there were no visits on the preceding day. As a nal proxy for stockouts, we also introduce
NOSALEc;t 1, which is a dummy variable indicating whether there were no sales of a particular
product on the preceding day.
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Figure 10 Field Evidence. Average Daily Unit Sales per Treatment and Control Color.
Note: Values withheld to protect condential company information.
4.7.2. Results and Discussion Figure 9 graphically depicts the pattern of average daily unit
sales per color, over the period of analysis, and Figure 10 displays the pattern in aggregate. Units
were withheld from both gures to protect condential company data, though the patterns are
illustrative. Notably, while the sales trend declines over the period, reecting diminished demand
in the post-holiday season, wallets in the treatment condition, where the cost transparency info-
graphic was introduced, exhibited less of a decline and sold more units after the introduction of
the infographic, relative to wallets where the infographic was not introduced.
Table 3, Column (1) presents our base specication, in which we model the daily number of
units sold per color combination as a function of the time period and treatment classication of
the product group. While the focal variable is insignicant (coecient=0:523;p=0:12 two-tailed),
the dierence becomes marginally signicant in Column (2) after controlling for the number of
visits (coecient =0:579;p<0:10 two-tailed). In Column (3), we introduce controls for whether no
customers visited the product on a given day, and the results intensify (coecient =0:660;p<0:05
two-tailed). In Column (4), we introduce an additional control, noting whether there were no sales
the prior day, and results remain marginally signicant (coecient = 0:582;p < 0:10 two-tailed).
Finally, in Column (5), we increment the bandwidth selection in the fully specied model. While22
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
 
Units Sold  Units Sold  Units Sold  Units Sold  Units Sold 
                 
Post  -0.945***  -0.921***  -0.959***  -0.850***  -0.850*** 
 
(0.273)  (0.258)  (0.257)  (0.238)  (0.262) 
            Post ⨉ Treatment  0.523  0.579*  0.660**  0.582*  0.582* 
 
(0.331)  (0.330)  (0.328)  (0.311)  (0.340) 
            Visits 
 
0.0591*  0.0488  0.0451  0.0451 
   
(0.0312)  (0.0316)  (0.0302)  (0.0312) 
            Visits
2 
 
-0.0002*  -0.0002  -0.0002  -0.0002 
   
(0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
            No visit 
   
-0.321**  -0.300**  -0.300** 
     
(0.153)  (0.152)  (0.153) 
            Lagged no visit 
   
-0.158  -0.113  -0.113 
     
(0.180)  (0.183)  (0.187) 
            Lagged no sale 
     
-0.460***  -0.460*** 
       
(0.142)  (0.150) 
                 
Observations  460  460  460  460  460 
Adjusted R-squared  0.044  0.050  0.052  0.067  0.067 
Bandwidth selection  2  2  2  2  3 
   
Table 2 Field Evidence. Units Sold on a Daily Basis, by Transparency Condition.
Treatment variable subsumed by Fixed Eects Estimation. Fixed Eect Coecients withheld to protect condential
company information. Robust Newey West standard errors in parentheses.
p< 0:10
p< 0:05
p< 0:01.
the standard errors inate, the results remain unchanged (coecient =0:582;p<0:10 two-tailed).
Using the estimates from the fully-specied model, we calculate that the introduction of the cost
transparency infographic increased daily unit sales on a per-color basis by 44.0% relative to average
unit sales across the entire period of observation.
5. General Discussion
We demonstrated that cost transparency - revealing a rm's variable costs of production - can
improve customer perceptions and rm performance. Cost transparency signicantly increased
purchase intent relative to operational transparency or margin transparency alone (Experiment
1-2). Consistent with previous research on disclosure and attraction, the eect of cost transparency
on willingness to buy is mediated by consumers' attraction to the disclosing rm (Moon 2000).
Moreover, the capacity for cost transparency to boost willingness to buy persists even when costs
are allocated in an undesirable way (Experiment 3). Brand relationship does not moderate the
eect of cost transparency on willingness to buy - the disclosure of sensitive cost information is23
appealing to consumers regardless of their prior relationship with a brand (Experiment 4). We then
demonstrated that the extent of the prot margin serves as a boundary condition: the benets of
cost transparency weakened - but did not reverse - when a rm disclosed higher prices relative
to cost (Experiment 5). Finally, we demonstrated that when markups are counter-normatively
high compared to competitors, cost transparency diminishes purchase intentions (Experiment 6).
Our nal study was a eld experiment with an online accessories retailer. The addition of a `cost
transparency' graphic denoting the costs of producing a wallet signicantly increased sales over a
ve-week period. This research implies that by revealing costs - typically tightly-guarded secrets
- managers can potentially improve both brand attraction and sales. Relative to other marketing
tactics, cost transparency might be an innovative and inexpensive way to build brand attraction
and sales.
5.1. Limitations
Our experimental design presented operational transparency and cost transparency in a very styl-
ized way. The eectiveness of disclosing cost information is likely aected by the presentation of
information, and the source of the information. The stimuli could be potentially strengthened if
animation or other website design changes are used to make the manipulation more salient (Buell
and Norton 2011).
All participants were American, with costs presented in US dollars. It is possible that the
evaluability of dierent currencies could moderate consumer choices when faced with cost trans-
parency (Raghubir and Srivastava 2002, Hsee 1996). Customers may also make negative inferences
if costs are presented in other currencies that indicate low wages and poor working conditions (i.e.
Bangladeshi Taka) (Paharia et al. 2013).
From a practical standpoint, there are important caveats a retailer would need to consider before
making the decision to reveal its costs. Firms may not want to disclose their costs if their cost
structure is a competitive advantage (Porter 1985). Moreover, a rm's suppliers may not allow the
rm to make the costs associated with certain components public information. Thus, there could
be strategic risks or contractual barriers to disclosure.
Even if rms want and are able to disclose their costs, they might not have the knowledge to do so.
Disclosing the variable costs associated with the production of a single good could be particularly
dicult for retailers that are not vertically integrated. While a retailer might be transparent about
certain aspects of price such as taxes (Carter and Curry 2010), it might not be feasible or even
possible to reveal costs for goods produced by a wide range of manufacturers. Moreover, for goods
and services that are dependent on high xed costs (R&D, overhead, constant labor costs), just
presenting variable costs may not portray an accurate picture to the customer. In our research,24
we focus only on variable costs, and do not reveal the xed costs incurred by a rm - therefore,
we systematically underrepresent the true costs associated with producing a good in each of our
studies.
5.2. Open Questions
Although we examined prot margin as a boundary condition (Experiment 5), future work could
further explore the relationship between price and cost. For instance, it would be useful to disen-
tangle whether consumers respond to changes in the absolute cost basis versus changes in price
relative to total cost.
Our research examines the eects of cost transparency for a single rm in a single industry.
Future research could explore what would happen if consumers evaluated two or more products
sold by the same rm, with varying levels of transparency. Cost transparency might also seem less
intimate in competitive environments when other rms disclose their costs. Thus, future research
could further explore the competitive ramications of cost transparency, to better understand what
happens in markets when multiple players reveal their costs for similar products.
Thus, there is still much to explore about the benets and potential pitfalls of cost transparency.
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